

discussion here. As a preliminary, it is necessary to state the theory held by Prof. Goodwin, and expounded by him in Appendix II. to the work above-mentioned, concerning the origin of the constructions of οὐ μή with the subjunctive and with the future indicative. It is briefly as follows. (1) The Greeks could say μὴ ποιήσῃ as meaning 'I suspect (or fear) that he will do it': this is 'the independent subjunctive with μὴ,' in which the negative force of μὴ is 'in abeyance'; *i.e.* the phrase is an affirmative proposition, cautiously expressed. (2) The next step was when they said οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ, as the negative form corresponding to the affirmative μὴ ποιήσῃ: 'he will not do it.' (3) Then, in Attic Greek, the future indicative came to be used in place of the subjunctive; for, as οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ had become 'a simple future denial,' it seemed natural to say οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ in the same sense.

It will be seen that Prof. Goodwin's theory differs from the older views in two main points. (1) In οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ he does not suppose an ellipse, after οὐ, of δέος ἐστίν or the like, but derives this construction directly from the 'independent subjunctive with μὴ.' [It must, however, be admitted, I suppose, that this 'independent subjunctive' itself had its origin in an ellipse: *i.e.* μὴ ποιήσῃ, as = 'I suspect that he will do it,' implies some verb of 'suspecting' or 'fearing' which is mentally supplied. The real distinction of Prof. Goodwin's view here is, then, that he supposes οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ to have arisen after all *consciousness* of such an ellipse had been lost through the familiarity of the idiom.] (2) Elmsley explained οὐ μὴ with fut. indic. by supposing that οὐ is interrogative, and that μὴ retains its separate negative force: *e.g.* οὐ μὴ διατρίψῃς meant, 'will you not not-delay?' *i.e.*, 'do not delay.' Prof. Goodwin explains it as simply an equivalent for οὐ μὴ διατρίψῃς (the fut. indic. being substituted for the aor. subjunct.): in both alike the force of μὴ is 'in abeyance'; both alike mean simply, 'you will not delay.'

I do not propose here to enter upon the historical question as to the origin of these constructions. What I wish to do is to consider Prof. Goodwin's application of his theory to a particular class of sentences; those, namely, in which a command *to do* something is coupled with a command *not to do* something else. In this class of sentences we find two different types, which I will call A and B.

(A) In the first type, the positive command stands first, and is introduced by the interrogative οὐ ('will you not do it?' = 'do it'). The negative command which follows is introduced by μηδέ (or καὶ μὴ):—

*Ai.* 75 οὐ σίγ' ἀνέξει μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀρεῖ;

According to Prof. Goodwin, the construction of οὐ μὴ with the fut. indic. does not come in here at all. The interrogative οὐ affects the first clause only: μὴ in the second clause asks an independent question. Thus on *Ai.* 75 he says (§ 299), 'μὴ δειλίαν ἀρεῖς [for he reads ἀρεῖς] is an independent question, *will you be a coward? = do not be a coward.*'

This explanation ignores the fact that the prohibition is introduced, not by a simple μὴ, but by μηδέ, or καὶ μὴ. If the words had been, οὐ σίγ' ἀνέξει; μὴ δειλίαν ἀρεῖ; then, indeed, we could construe them