

(2) From ἀλεύω the fut. ἀλεύσω is quoted (*Anecd. Bekk.* p. 383, 4) as used by Sophocles in the sense of φυλάξω. The aorist ἤλευσα is used by Aeschylus, but only in the sense of averting: *Theb.* 87 ἀλεύσατε: *ib.* 141 and *Suppl.* 528 ἄλευσον. The only aorist middle which occurs elsewhere is the epic ἤλευάμην (*Il.* 13. 184 etc.).

These facts create the strongest probability that Sophocles would have written ἐξαλύξωμαι rather than ἐξαλεύσωμαι.

679 ff. The maxim of Bias.—*Diog. Laert.* 1. 5 § 87 (of Bias) ἐλεγέτε τὸν βίον οὕτω μετρέειν <? δεῖν > ὡς καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιωσομένους, καὶ φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας· τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους εἶναι κακοῦς. If Bias really assigned this ground for his maxim, then Sophocles is true to its original spirit when he makes Ajax give a similar reason,—τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ | βροτῶν ἄπιστός ἐσθ' ἑταιρείας λιμὴν (682 f.). The prevalent sentiment of antiquity probably regarded φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας as a cynical precept. Thus Aristotle recommends a speaker, if he desires to appear amiable, to say, οὐ δεῖ, ὡς περ φασί, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας (*Rhet.* 2. 21 § 13). Cicero speaks very strongly, *De Amic.* 16. 59: (*Scipio*) *negabat ullam vocem inimicitiorum amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus: nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam.* On this view, the thought underlying φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας is, 'human friendship is never trustworthy.'

But evidently the maxim is susceptible of another interpretation. It could be explained as a rule of prudence, not necessarily tinged with cynicism: then the thought would be, 'It is a serious thing to put oneself unreservedly in any one's power; therefore be careful whom you admit to your intimacy.' This is the construction put upon the precept by Demosthenes, *or.* 23 § 122: ἔστι γὰρ οὐχ ὑγαινότων, οἶμαι, ἀνθρώπων οὐθ' ὅταν τινὰ ὑπειλήφωσι φίλον, οὕτω πιστεύειν ὥστε, ἂν ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ, τὸ ἀμύνασθαι σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀφελέσθαι, οὐθ' ὅταν ἐχθρόν τινα ἡγῶνται, οὕτως αὐ μισεῖν ὥστε, ἂν παυσάμενος βούληται φίλος εἶναι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξεῖναι ταῦτα κωλύσαι· ἀλλ' ἄχρι τούτου καὶ φιλεῖν, οἶμαι, χρὴ καὶ μισεῖν, μηδετέρου τὸν καιρὸν ὑπερβάλλοντας. (All this is compatible with unreserved confidence in proved friends.)

Bacon's criticism is in a similar spirit, *De Augm. Scient.* VIII. c. 2: *Septimum praeceptum est antiquum illud Biantis; modo non ad perfidiam, sed ad cautionem et moderationem adhibeatur; Et ames tanquam inimicus futurus, et oderis tanquam amaturus. Nam utilitates quasque [? quasdam] mirum in modum prodit et corrumpit, si quis nimium se immerserit amicitii infelicibus, molestis et turbidis odiis, aut puerilibus et futilibus aemulationibus.* That is, the precept is not to be understood as excusing disloyalty to friends (*perfidiam*), but merely as a warning against rashness in forming ill-chosen intimacies, which may afterwards prove embarrassing.

Montaigne, in referring to the maxim, draws a like distinction: 'Ce précepte, qui est si abominable en ceste souveraine et maistresse amitié,